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All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments
are founded on their authority and instituted for their peace,
safety and happiness. For the advancement of these ends they
have at all times an inalienable right to alter, reform, or abolish
their government in such a manner as they may think proper.
The Pennsylvania Constitution proudly proclaims in its Declaration
of Rights that all power rests with the people.2 The United States
Constitution reflects this same basic principle through protections
secured in the Bill of Rights
Much of the Bill of Rights preserves the liberties of the people
by limiting the authority of the government.' In order to protect
against the tyranny of the few, the Founding Fathers adopted a
governmental system based upon the separation of powers This
fundamental structure is an essential component of the system of
checks and balances, designed to prevent the unhealthy
concentration of power in any one branch of the system. Many
states, including Pennsylvania, also use this "three branch"
framework to take advantage of its accompanying safeguards.6
Despite these structural protections and lofty constitutional
pronouncements, occasionally trusted public officials still engage in
1. PA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
2. See id.
3. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I-X.
4. See id.
5. See U.S. CONsT. art. I-III. These articles divide the federal government's
power into a legislative branch (Article I), an executive branch (Article II), and a
judicial branch (Article III). See id.
6. See PA. CONsT. art. II, IV, and V. Article II outlines the powers of the
Pennsylvania legislature, known as the General Assembly. See id. Article IV
grants the executive power to the governor, while Article V vests the judicial
power in the courts of Pennsylvania. See id.
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questionable conduct. Unfortunately, this remains a persistent
problem for both the states and the federal government today. The
most delicate and difficult investigations are those involving
allegations against public officials who maintain control over law
enforcement agencies or the government's prosecutorial machine.
At the federal level, these individuals include the president,
members of the executive branch, and the attorney general and
members of her Justice Department staff. It was because of this
inherent conflict of interest that Congress originally passed the
Ethics in Government Act in 1978.7 This legislation provided for
the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate high-
ranking executive branch officials accused of possible wrongdoing.8
The recent impeachment of President William Jefferson
Clinton was the culmination of such an investigation.9 The Clinton
impeachment trial in the United States Senate was the result of
nearly five years of investigative work, weeks of bitter, partisan
hearings before the House Judiciary Committee, and a largely
party-line vote to approve articles of impeachment against the
president.'" Throughout this process, the impeachment proceedings
involved all three branches of the federal government- executive11,
legislative12, and judicial.13
7. See Joseph S. Hall, et al., Independent Counsel Investigations, 36 AM.
CRIM. L. Rev. 809 (1999). The Ethics in Government Act was codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994). See id. Because this legislation provides
for the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate certain officials
within the federal government, it will hereinafter be referred to as the "federal
independent counsel statute." See id.
8. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
9. See Peter Baker & Juliet Eilperin, Clinton Impeached: House Approves
Articles Charging Perjury, Obstruction; Mostly Partisan Vote Shifts Drama to
Senate, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1998, at Al. See also Steven Thomma, et al., Clinton
Impeached; Action is 2d Ever in U.S. History, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 20, 1998, at
Al; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (providing that the president may be removed from
office "on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.")
10. See Baker & Eilperin, supra note 9, at Al. See also Peter Baker & Helen
Dewar, Clinton Acquitted: 2 Impeachment Articles Fail to Win Senate Majority;
Five Republicans Join Democrats in Voting Down Both Charges, WASH. POST, Feb.
13, 1999, at Al; Steven Thomma, et al., Clinton Acquitted: 2 Articles Fail to Get a
Majority in Senate, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 13, 1999, at Al.
11. Obviously, much of the energies of the executive were put into defending
the articles of impeachment in the trial before the Senate.
12. Under the United States Constitution, the House of Representatives
possesses the sole power of impeachment. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. The
Senate has the sole power to try impeachments. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
13. The United States Constitution requires the Chief Justice of the United
States to preside over any Senate trial against the president. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 3, cl. 6. Therefore, Chief Justice William Rehnquist presided over the Clinton
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This national spectacle helped lead to Congress' decision not
to renew the federal independent counsel law for another five
years." Instead, Congress allowed the law to expire on June 30,
1999."5 There are no immediate plans for its revival. 6
The need for an independent investigation of an executive or a
top law enforcement official is not unique to the federal
government, however. 7  On February 18, 1998, Pennsylvania
Governor Thomas J. Ridge signed into law legislation creating a
system by which an independent counsel can be appointed in
Pennsylvania.8 The Pennsylvania law, largely modeled on its
federal predecessor, provides a mechanism for the appointment of
an independent counsel to investigate the state attorney general or
a member of his staff. 9
Will the Pennsylvania law suffer the same fate as its federal
counterpart? What characteristics, if any, make Pennsylvania's
legislation more likely to stand the test of time? Part II of this
comment will discuss the reasons why the Pennsylvania General
Assembly chose to enact an independent counsel statute. Part III
will look at the provisions of the state statute and briefly will
examine the federal statute. Part IV will analyze why the
Pennsylvania statute likely will enjoy a better fate than the federal
law after which it was modeled.
II. History of the Pennsylvania Statute
On June 13, 1995, Pennsylvania Attorney General Ernest D.
Preate, Jr., plead guilty to a felony charge of mail fraud.' That
same day, Preate sent Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge his letter
impeachment. The usual presiding officer in the Senate is the vice president of the
United States, who would have a possible conflict of interest during any
impeachment trial. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
14. See Robert Suro, As Special Counsel Law Expires, Power Will Shift to
Reno, WASH. POST, June 30, 1999, at A6. The federal independent counsel law
had a five year sunset provision and automatically expired when Congress failed to
renew it. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994).
15. See Suro, supra note 14, at A6.
16. See id.
17. The Pennsylvania General Assembly passed the independent counsel
statute largely in response to a scandal involving Attorney General Ernest D.
Preate, Jr. See infra Part II.
18. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9301-9352 (1999). See also Inside the Capitol,
PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Feb. 20, 1998, at B3 (reporting on signing of
Independent Counsel Authorization Act).
19. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9301-9352.
20. See Robert Moran, Preate Pleads Guilty to Mail Fraud, PHILA. INOUIRER,
June 14, 1995, at Al. See also Preate Pleads Guilty, Resigns, PATRIOT-NEWS
(Harrisburg), June 14, 1995, at Al.
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of resignation, effective June 23, 1995.21 On December 14, 1995, a
federal court sentenced Preate to 14 months in prison and fined him
$25,000.22
The charges against Preate stemmed from his acceptance of
illegal campaign contributions from video poker operators. 3 Preate
never reported the contributions, which were made to help offset
costs incurred during Preate's reelection campaign when he served
as Lackawanna County district attorney in the mid-1980s and
during his first campaign for attorney general in 1988.24 In return
for the campaign money, Preate allegedly promised not to enforce
state gambling laws against the operators.2
The charges against Preate were outlined first by the
Pennsylvania Crime Commission, which conducted a two-year
investigation of the video poker situation. 6 Along with the Crime
Commission's investigation, federal authorities began looking into
Preate's ties to the video poker industry.27 By early 1995, federal
prosecutors informed Preate that he was being targeted for possible
racketeering violations and for conspiring with the video
operators.' While Preate's subsequent guilty plea was related only
to the charges involving the video poker operators, the prosecutors
in the case said they were prepared to offer evidence that Preate
had attempted to sell his office to a number of "other illegal
enterprises.
'21
Preate served 11 of his 14 months in a federal prison in
Minnesota and was released to a halfway house in December 1996,
21. See Moran, supra note 20, at Al.
22. See Pete Shellem, Preate Gets 14 Months in Jail, EVENING-NEWS
(Harrisburg), Dec. 14, 1995, at Al. See also Robert Moran, Preate Gets 14 Month
Term, $25,000 Fine, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 15, 1995, at Al. For an excellent
recounting of the events that led to Preate's guilty plea and sentencing, see Pete
Shellem, Chronology, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Dec. 15, 1995, at B4.
23. See Robert Moran, Guilty Plea is Expected from Preate, PHILA. INQUIRER,
June 10, 1995, at Al. See also Peter J. Shelley & Pete Shellem, Chronology of a
Plea, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), June 14, 1995, at A8.
24. See Moran, supra note 23, at Al; Shelley & Shellem, supra note 23, at A8.
25. See Shelley & Shellem, supra note 23, at A8.
26. See id. See also PA. CRIME COMM'N, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE
CONDUCT OF LACKAWANNA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY/ATTORNEY GENERAL
ERNEST D. PREATE, JR. (1994).
27. See Shelley & Shellem, supra note 23, at A8.
28. See id.
29. See Shellem, Preate Gets 14 Months in Jail, supra note 22, at Al.
Specifically, a mistakenly released transcript of an October 1995 hearing that was
supposed to be closed showed that federal prosecutors were prepared "to prove
that Preate received cash contributions from the late Philadelphia Mayor Frank
Rizzo and had laundered contributions through the Republican State Committee."
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where he served the final month of his sentence." In addition to the
jail time, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suspended Preate's
license to practice law.31 The five-year suspension was retroactive
to his 1995 guilty plea, and Preate can apply to have his license
restored in August of 2000.32
Largely as a result of the Preate scandal, the Pennsylvania
General Assembly began to consider ways to restore accountability
and public confidence to the Office of the Attorney General.3
Proposed legislation focused on the need to provide for an
independent entity to conduct investigations and prosecutions of
the attorney general and members of his staff.' The problems of
the Preate era suggested that such a mechanism was needed
because, under usual circumstances, it is the attorney general
himself who is normally charged with conducting criminal
investigations and prosecutions.
Legislation creating the Office of the Independent Counsel was
introduced in the Pennsylvania General Assembly as early as May
1994, over a year before Preate's resignation.' The legislation died
at the end of that session and was reintroduced in both chambers
early in 1995."7 That time, the law passed both chambers in
30. See Pete Shellem, Preate to be Released Today for the Holidays, PATRIOT-
NEWS (Harrisburg), Dec. 19, 1996, at Al.
31. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Preate, No. J-4-99 (Pa. filed June 23,
1999). See also Preate Loses License for 5 Years; 2 Justices Say He Should Have
Been Disbarred, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), June 24, 1999, at B3.
32 See Preate Loses License for 5 Years, supra note 31, at B3.
33. See Peter J. Shelly, Panel Approves Prosecutor Bill, PATRIOT-NEWS
(Harrisburg), May 26, 1994, at B3. See also Pete Shellem, Preate Aide Says Plan is
Politically Motivated, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Apr. 7, 1994, at B1; Peter J.
Shelley & Adam Bell, House Vote Asks for an Independent Prober of Preate,
PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Oct. 5, 1994, at B1.
34. See sources cited supra note 33.
35. See William Cornell, Public Corruption: State Requires an Independent
Counsel, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Sept. 3, 1996, at A7.
36. During the legislative session of 1993-94, Representative Jeffrey E. Piccola
introduced House Bill 2741, which passed the House 194-4 on October 4, 1994, but
later died in the Senate. See H.B. 2741, 178th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Pa. 1994). Senator
David W. Heckler introduced similar legislation as Senate Bill 1707. See S.B. 1707,
178th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Pa. 1994). That bill was never voted out of the Senate
Judiciary Committee. See id.
37. During the legislative session of 1995-96, Representative Piccola
reintroduced the legislation as House Bill 981. See H.B. 981, 179th Leg., 1st Sess.
(Pa. 1995). House Bill 981 passed the House 197-0 on November 20, 1995. See id.
It was subsequently amended in the Senate, where it passed by a 50-0 vote on
November 26, 1996. See H.B. 981,179th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Pa. 1996). The legislation
was returned to the House, but the General Assembly's adjournment prevented
the House from considering the Senate's amendments. See id. See also Jeanette
Krebs, Counsel Idea Dies of Neglect, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Nov. 29, 1996,
2000]
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different forms, but it died when the legislature failed to reconcile
the two versions before the General Assembly adjourned at the end
of 1996.38 The legislation was reintroduced in early 1997, and it
finally passed both chambers in February 1998, when the legislature
included its language as part of a wiretapping surveillance statute.39
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge signed the Independent
Counsel Authorization Act into law on February 18, 1998.'
III. The Statutes
A. The Pennsylvania Statute
Pennsylvania's independent counsel statute is modeled after its
federal predecessor." The law establishes a systematic investigative
process that must be followed in order to appoint an independent
counsel." An independent counsel may be appointed in order to
investigate certain "covered persons," namely the attorney general,
any deputy attorney general, or any individual working in the
attorney general's office classified as a "public employee., 43 The
statute also covers former employees of the current attorney
general's office and top-ranking officials of the attorney general's
campaign committee. '
at B1. Senator Heckler also introduced similar legislation in the Senate as Senate
Bill 1127, which again died in the Senate Judiciary Committee. See S.B. 1127,
179th Leg., 1st Sess. (Pa. 1995).
3& See Krebs, supra note 37, at B1.
39. Representative Albert Masland introduced House Bill 1378, which died in
the House Judiciary Committee. See H.B. 1378, 180th Leg., 1st Sess. (Pa. 1997).
Senator Jeffrey Piccola introduced Senate Bill 969 which passed first consideration
in the Senate but died in the Senate Appropriations Committee. See S.B. 969,
180th Leg., 1st Sess. (Pa. 1997). Senator Piccola won a special election to fill a
vacant Senate seat and moved from the House to the Senate in November of 1995,
where he continued to be a strong advocate of the independent counsel legislation.
See Stephanie Ebbert, Independent Counsel Bill OK'd, PATRIOT-NEWS
(Harrisburg), Nov. 21, 1995, at B16. The Independent Counsel Authorization Act
was amended into Senate Bill 635, originally legislation dealing with wiretapping
surveillance, during the 1997-98 legislative session. See S.B. 635, 180th Leg., 1st
Sess. (Pa. 1997). Senate Bill 635 passed the Senate (in its final form) on February
10, 1998, by a vote of 36 to 12. See id. The House concurred by a vote of 115 to 82
on February 11, 1998. See id. The legislation was placed in the hands of the
governor on February 12, 1998. See id.
40. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9301-9352 (1999). See also Inside the Captiol,
supra note 18, at B3.
41. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9301-9352 (Pennsylvania's independent counsel
law). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994) (the federal independent counsel law).
42. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9301-9352.
43. See id. § 9312(c).
44. See id. The provision allowing for investigation of a member of the
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1. The Initial Investigative Process-The first step in the
appointment process begins when the governor's Office of General
Counsel appoints a special investigative counsel to conduct a
preliminary investigation of a covered person. 5 The goal of the
preliminary investigation is to determine whether or not an
independent counsel should be appointed."6 Under the law, the
Office of General Counsel is authorized to appoint a special
investigative counsel when sufficient information exists that a
"covered person" may have committed an offense higher than a
misdemeanor of the second degree or an offense involving a breach
of the public trusty.4 The general counsel also may appoint a special
investigative counsel to look into alleged violations of the
Pennsylvania Election Code or of the Public Official and Employee
Ethics Law.' The attorney general also is required to request that
the general counsel appoint a special investigative counsel when it
is clear that an investigation or prosecution by the attorney general
or a member of his staff may result in a personal, financial, or
political conflict of interest.
The general counsel has 30 days from the date on which he
receives the information, that would suggest that an investigation
may be necessary, to appoint the special investigative counsel.
The special investigative counsel then reviews all matters that are
within the scope of the investigation and makes a determination as
attorney general's campaign committee is especially relevant, given that Attorney
General Preate's wrongdoing arose out of his campaign financing. See supra Part
II.
45. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9312. The general counsel, which is an executive
branch position appointed by the governor, was chosen as the starting point of the
process for constitutional reasons. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694-95
(1988). In Morrison v. Olson, the United States Supreme Court upheld the federal
independent counsel law. See id. at 696-97. The Court held that in order to
preserve the constitutional separation of powers, the "trigger" for the appointment
of any independent counsel must lie in the executive branch, which has the duty to
execute the laws and prosecute criminal cases. See id. at 694-95. At the federal
level, the trigger mechanism lies with the attorney general. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-
592. The most closely analogous executive branch position in Pennsylvania is the
general counsel. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 732-301 (West 1990) (establishing
the Office of the General Counsel and providing for the appointment of a general
counsel to serve as legal adviser to the governor). Under the Pennsylvania statute,
the process begins when the general counsel receives information that is "sufficent
to constitute grounds to investigate" whether one of the covered persons may have
committed a covered offense. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9312(a).
46. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9312-9315.
47. See id. § 9312(a).
48. See id.
49. See id. § 9312(b).
50. See id. § 9313.
2000]
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to whether an independent counsel is required." This preliminary
investigation may last no longer than 90 days, although it may be
extended once for an additional 60 days.
2. Appointment of an Independent Counsel-The special
investigate counsel must report the results of his investigation to a
special three-judge panel that is created by the Independent
Counsel Authorization Act. 3 This "Special Independent Pros-
ecutor's Panel" is composed of one judge of the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania and two judges from the Pennsylvania
Courts of Common Pleas. ' The panel members are chosen by lot.
5
If the special investigative counsel determines that there are no
reasonable grounds for further investigation, he must notify the
special panel of his determination. 6
If, however, the special investigative counsel determines that
there are sufficient grounds to proceed with further investigation,
then the special investigative counsel must apply to the three-judge
panel to ask for the appointment of an independent counsel.57 The
information that the special investigative counsel submits to the
three-judge panel must be sufficient to allow the panel to select an
appropriate independent counsel and to define that person's
prosecutorial jurisdiction.5 ' The special investigative counsel's
51. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9313 (1999).
52. See id.
53. See id. §§ 9311, 9314-9315.
54. See id. § 9311. The first (and current) three judges who were chosen for
this panel include its chair, Judge Rochelle S. Friedman from the Commonwealth
Court, Judge Paul W. Tressler from the Montgomery County Court of Common
Pleas, and Donald E. Machen from the Allegheny County Court of Common
Pleas. See 204 PA. CODE § 215.1 (1999).
55. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9311(a).
56. See id. § 9314. Specifically, the statute provides that
[i]f the special investigative counsel upon completion of a preliminary
investigation under this chapter determines that there are no reasonable
grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted, the special
investigative counsel shall promptly so notify the panel, and the panel
shall have no power to appoint an independent counsel with respect to
the matters involved.
Id.
57. See id. § 9315.
58. See id. § 9316. Specifically, the statute provides that
[a]ny application for the appointment of an independent counsel under
this chapter shall contain sufficient information to assist the panel in
selecting an independent counsel and in defining that independent
counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction so that the independent counsel has
adequate authority to fully investigate and prosecute the subject matter and
all matters related to that subject matter.
[Vol. 104:4
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decision to ask for an independent counsel is not reviewable by any
court.5 9
Once the panel receives the application, the panel then has the
responsibility to appoint an independent counsel and to define his
prosecutorial jurisdiction.60 The appointment must occur within 30
days after the receipt of the application from the special
investigative counsel.6 Once appointed, the independent counsel's
jurisdiction is limited to that outlined in his grant of authority from
the three-judge panel.62
If the independent counsel learns of information about
possible criminal violations not covered by his prosecutorial
jurisdiction, then he must submit that information to the general
counsel.63 The general counsel then begins a new preliminary
investigation under the statute, and the entire review process starts
again.' This safeguard insures that the independent counsel's
jurisdiction will be expanded only after a careful review, including
the consent of the three-judge panel.65 In the event the preliminary
investigation finds that there are no grounds for expanding the
independent counsel's investigation, then the independent counsel
is required to turn over any information outside of his jurisdiction
to the appropriate law enforcement agency.66
3. Authorities and Duties of the Independent Counsel- Once
the three-judge panel appoints the independent counsel, that
person has full authority to conduct investigations and initiate any
59. See id. § 9318.
60. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9319(a) (1999). When appointing the
independent counsel, the three-judge panel is to appoint
an individual who has appropriate experience and who will conduct the
investigation and any prosecution in a prompt, responsible and cost-
effective manner. The panel shall seek to appoint as independent counsel
an individual who will serve to the extent necessary to complete the
investigation and any prosecution without undue delay. The panel may
not appoint as an independent counsel any person who holds any office
of profit or trust with the Commonwealth. No person who is serving as a
special investigative counsel may be appointed or serve as an
independent counsel in the matter for which they had been appointed to
investigate as special investigative counsel. If an independent counsel is
appointed, the independent counsel may only accept the appointment




62 See id. § 9319.
63. See id. § 9319(b).
64. See id.




necessary legal proceedings, including proceedings before grand
juries. The independent counsel has the authority to engage in
any necessary litigation, including civil and criminal trials.' The
counsel has the authority to hire additional personnel and to
request assistance from the Pennsylvania State Police.69
In addition to the authority to initiate necessary legal
proceedings, the statute requires the independent counsel to submit
a report to the three-judge panel every six months that details and
explains major expenses, as well as estimates future expenses.70
When the independent counsel finishes his work, he must submit a
final report71 that fully describes all prosecutions to the three-judge
67. See id. § 9331. The statute says
[i]nvestigative and prosecutorial functions and powers shall include, but
are not limited to:
1. Conducting proceedings before grand juries and other invest-
igations.
2. Participating in court proceedings and engaging in any litigation,
including civil and criminal matters, that the independent counsel
considers necessary.
3. Appealing any decision of a court in any case or proceeding in
which the independent counsel participates in an official capacity.
4. Reviewing all documentary evidence available from any source.
5. Determining whether to contest the assertion of any testimonial
privilege.
6. Receiving appropriate security clearances and, if necessary, con-
testing in court, including where appropriate, participating in an in
camera proceeding, any claim of privilege or attempt to withhold
evidence on grounds of security.
7. Making applications to any State court for a grant of immunity to
any witness, consistent with applicable statutory requirements, or for
warrants, subpoenas or other court orders, and exercising the
authority vested in the Attorney General or a district attorney.
8. Inspecting, obtaining or using the original or a copy of any tax
return in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations.
9. Initiating and conducting prosecutions in any court of competent
jurisdiction, framing and signing indictments, filing information and
handling all aspects of any case in the name of the Commonwealth.
10. Consulting with the district attorney for the county in which any
violation of law with respect to which the independent counsel is
appointed was alleged to have occurred.
Id.
68. See id.
69. See id. §§ 9333-9334.
70. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9337 (1999).
71. The statute says that the Office of Independent Counsel is terminated
when the counsel "notifies the [three-judge] panel that the investigation of all
matters within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of the independent counsel or
accepted by the independent counsel have been completed" and the independent
counsel "files a final report" as directed under the statute. See id. § 9343.
[Vol. 104:4
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panel." The statute says that all other information is confidential
and is not subject to public disclosure.73
4. Ongoing Investigations-Since the Pennsylvania independ-
ent counsel law was signed into law in February 1998, the three-
judge panel has appointed two independent counsels. The first
was appointed in February 1999 to investigate a senior deputy
attorney general on allegations she violated Pennsylvania's
wiretapping and surveillance act by playing secretly recorded
surveillance tapes for her boyfriend.75 The independent counsel
filed four felony and four misdemeanor charges against the deputy
in September 1999.76 However, a district justice dismissed six of the
eight charges in December 1999, leaving only one felony and one
misdemeanor charge.7 The independent counsel then accepted a
plea agreement to admit the deputy attorney general into a one-
year probation program for first-time offenders which, if
successfully completed, will result in the clearing of all wiretap
violations.
In a second probe, the three-judge panel appointed an
independent counsel in July 1999 to investigate two members of the
attorney general's staff. 9 Reports had the probe focused on a
private law practice where one of the staffers was a partner and the
other was of counsel to the firm, after they had worked in the
72 See id. § 9337.
73. See id.
74. See Peter J. Shelly, State's Counsel Starts Job, PrrrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Mar. 1, 1999, at Al. See also Pete Shellem, Attorney to Face Wiretap Charges,
PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Sept. 23, 1999, at Al.
75. The three-judge panel appointed Anthony M. Mariani, a former federal
prosecutor from Pittsburgh, on February 4, 1999, to investigate Senior Deputy
Attorney General Marsha V. Mills. See 204 PA. CODE § 215.1 (1999). See also
Shellem, Attorney to Face Wiretap Charges, supra note 74, at Al. The panel
granted an extension of the independent counsel's jurisdiction on June 25, 1999.
See 204 PA. CODE § 215.1.
76. See Jack Sherzer, Official to Face Wiretap Charges, PATRIOT-NEWS
(Harrisburg), Sept. 24, 1999, at BI.
77. See Pete Shellem, 6 of 8 Charges Dropped in Tapes Case, PATRIOT-NEWS
(Harrisburg), Dec. 17, 1999, at B9.
78. See Pete Shellem, Wiretap Charges Result in Probation, PATRIOT-NEWS
(Harrisburg), Mar. 29, 2000, at B8.
79. The three-judge panel appointed William F. Manifesto, a Pittsburgh
criminal defense attorney, to investigate Chief Deputy Attorney General Douglas
Yauger and Executive Deputy Attorney General Donald Minahan. See 204 PA.
CODE § 215.1. See also Pete Shellem, Probe Focuses on 2 Lawyers for State; Pair
Under Investigation by Independent Counsel, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Aug.
23, 1999, at Al. Yauger was the head of the state attorney general's Bureau of
Consumer Protection, but resigned amid the investigation on September 17, 1999.
See Shellem, Attorney to Face Wiretap Charges, supra note 74, at Al.
20001
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attorney general's office.' Allegations included that the pair had
improper contact with individuals still working at the Bureau of
Consumer Protection81 after they had left that office.' The alleged
contact apparently included sharing files and referring cases.83 The
attorney general's office later rehired the two, which is when the
probe began 4
Because the independent counsels have yet to file any reports
detailing their investigations and prosecutions, it is difficult to tell
exactly how the process has worked. 5 It is worth noting, however,
that there have been no reports of any significant structural
problems. Once the independent counsels file their required
reports, the General Assembly, as well as the public, should have a
better idea just how well the statute is operating in practice.
B. The Federal Statute
The Pennsylvania independent counsel statute is modeled
closely after the federal independent counsel legislation.' For this
reason, the two statutes have very similar provisions.' As many
people have become aware, the federal statute also provided for the
appointment of an independent counsel to investigate top officials
in the executive branch of the federal government.'
Under the federal statute, the United States attorney general
conducted the preliminary investigation and, if warranted, made an
application to a special division of the United States court of
80. See Report Says Attorney General's Deputies Will be Investigated, PA. L.
WKLY., Aug. 30, 1999, at 2.
81. The Bureau of Consumer Protection is an agency under the direction of
the state attorney general, who appoints the bureau's director. See PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, § 732-201(c) (West 1990).
82. See Report Says Attorney General's Deputies Will be Investigated, supra
note 80, at 2.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9337(a) (1999) (requiring the independent
counsel to file reports and outlining confidentiality).
86. See id. 88 9311-9352. See also 28 U.S.C. §8 591-599 (1994). Congress
originally passed the Ethics in Government Act, which contained the process for
appointing an independent counsel, in 1978. See Hall, et al., supra note 7, at 809.
Congress' action came in the wake of the Watergate crisis. See id. at 811-12.
87. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9311-9352 (Pennsylvania's independent counsel
law). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (the federal independent counsel law).
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 591. The most recent version of the statute also allowed
for an independent counsel to investigate members of Congress. See 28 U.S.C. §
591(c)(2). However, the potential conflict of interest is not quite as serious when a
member of Congress is the target of an investigation, as legislative branch officials
lack the direct control over prosecutions that is found in the executive branch.
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appeals in Washington, D.C., for the appointment of an
independent counsel.89 In the event the attorney general herself
was the object of the pending investigation, the attorney general
had a statutory obligation to recuse herself and to allow the most
senior member of the Justice Department who had not been forced
to recuse himself to handle the preliminary investigation and make
the application to the Special Division for appointment of an
independent counsel.'
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's investigation into
President Clinton's Whitewater land deal and the subsequent
investigations it spawned is the most recent example of an
investigation conducted under the federal independent counsel
statute.9' As a result of the investigation of President Clinton, the
independent counsel uncovered evidence that he felt may have
shown grounds for the impeachment of the president.9 The federal
statute required the independent counsel to turn over that
information to the House of Representatives for its consideration.93
The independent counsel's report to Congress formed the basis
from which the House of Representatives drafted the articles of
impeachment against President Clinton. '
The long partisan drama that ensued dramatically reduced the
popularity of the federal statute.95  Following the Clinton
impeachment, the statute lacked enough support to be renewed for
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 592.
90. See id. § 591(e).
91. See generally Robert W. Gordon, Imprudence and Partisanship: Starr's
OIC and the Clinton-Lewinsky Affair, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 639 (1999).
92. See Peter Baker & Susan Schmidt, Starr Submits Report to House Counsel;
Cites Substantial and Credible Evidence of Impeachable Acts, WASH. POST, Sept.
10, 1998, at Al.
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 595(c).
94. See Baker & Eilperin, supra note 9, at Al.
95. In fact, a large number of constituencies argued that Congress should not
renew the law. See Dick Polman, Independent Counsel Law is Dying Friendless,
PHILA. INQUIRER, June 27, 1999, at El. Those opposed to the law included
members of Congress, the Justice Department, the American Bar Association, and
even Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr himself. See George Lardner, Jr. & Dan
Morgan, Senate Chairman Favors End to Independent Counsel Law, WASH. POST,
Dec. 11, 1998, at A29; Dan Morgan & George Lardner, Jr., U.S. Sours on Counsel
Law: Justice Department to Testify Statute is Fundamentally Flawed, WASH. POST,
Mar. 2, 1999, at Al; Laurie Kellman, Justice Department: Counsel Law Should
Expire - The Clinton Administration Withdrew Support for the Independent
Prosecutor Legislation, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 3, 1999, at A2; George Lardner, Jr.,
ABA Advocates End to Independent Counsels, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1999, at A3;
Roberto Suro & Guy Gugliotta, Starr to Oppose Independent Counsel Statute:
Process is Called Legally Dubious, WASH. Post, Apr. 14, 1999, at Al.
2000]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:4
another five years.9 The statute expired on June 30, 1999, and
there are no plans to revive it anytime soon.'
IV. Analysis of the Pennsylvania Statute
Despite the demise of the federal independent counsel statute,
it appears that the Pennsylvania statute may not endure the same
fate. First, this section will examine why the Pennsylvania statute is
necessary in order to close a loophole to allow for the criminal
investigation and prosecution of the state attorney general or a
member of his staff.98 Then this section will examine why the
circumstances surrounding the Pennsylvania statute make it more
likely that the statute will be successful in achieving its goal without
suffering from the shortcomings that have come to be associated
with the federal statute.99
A. Why the Statute is Necessary
Under the Commonwealth Attorneys Act,00 the attorney
general has extensive powers to prosecute criminal cases. 1 The
office is an elected position, so its occupant holds considerable
political power as well." The attorney general's authority allows
him to prosecute state officials or employees, or he may refer such
matters to a county district attorney for purposes of prosecution.0 3
96. See Suro, supra note 14, at A6. Following the statute's expiration, the
responsibility for conducting investigations of allegations against executive branch
officials, including the president, reverted back to the Justice Department. See id.
Under new regulations, the attorney general has the sole power to appoint and
remove special investigative counsels. See id.
97. See id.
9& See infra Part III.A.
99. See infra Part III.B and C.
100. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 732-101 to -506 (West 1990).
101. See id. § 732-205.
102. See PA. CONST. art. IV § 4.1. The attorney general was not always elected,
however. Pennsylvania amended its constitution in 1978 to allow for election,
rather than the appointment of the attorney general by the governor. See id.
Following the Preate scandal, a number of legislators suggested returning to the
appointment method of selection. See DeWeese: Make Post Appointed, PATRIOT-
NEWS (Harrisburg), June 12, 1995, at B1. It seems that an elected official, as
opposed to one who is appointed, likely has more accountability, as he must
ultimately answer to the people.
103. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 732-205. Specifically, the Commonwealth
Attorneys Act provides that the attorney general has the power to prosecute
"[c]riminal charges against State officials or employees affecting the performance
of their public duties or the maintenance of the public trust and criminal charges
against persons attempting to influence such State officials or employees or benefit
from such influence or attempt to influence." Id. § 732-205(a)(1). The statute says
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However, there is no provision in the Commonwealth Attorneys
Act to provide an outside trigger mechanism for a situation where
possible prosecution by the attorney general" may result in a
conflict of interest.'-
Prior to the passage of the independent counsel statute, if such
a conflict existed, the attorney general did have the choice himself
to appoint a special deputy to investigate a particular matter.'
6
This, however, did not seem to be a reasonable solution. Even if
the attorney general did not actually oversee the investigation,
there could still be a public perception that the investigation was
not truly independent. Therefore, the investigation might lack both
fairness and impartiality simply because the attorney general
selected the investigating deputy.
Another possible option would be to have a county district
attorney prosecute such a case."° However, this is also likely not an
acceptable alternative. Most district attorneys enjoy a working
relationship with the attorney general. Their offices may be
working together on a number of other prosecutions and
investigations. In addition, many district attorneys have a personal
or political relationship with the attorney general that could also
hinder a truly independent and unbiased prosecution."
The only other possible prosecutorial avenue would be to have
federal authorities lead the investigation.' While this could be an
acceptable alternative if the investigation involves a federal crime,
state officials could be powerless to prosecute crimes arising purely
that the attorney general has "concurrent prosecutorial jurisdiction with the
district attorney" for such cases. See id. § 732-205(b).
104. Of course, in most of these instances, it would probably be more
appropriate to say that the real problem exists when there needs to be a
prosecution of the attorney general or a member of his staff.
105. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 732-205.
106. See id.
107. See id. § 732-205(b) (giving the attorney general and district attorneys
concurrent jurisdiction for cases involving criminal charges against state officials or
employees and allowing the attorney general to refer such cases to a district
attorney).
108. The attorney general and county district attorneys have concurrent
jurisdiction over certain kinds of prosecutions. See id. In addition, the attorney
general is the "chief law enforcement officer of the Commonwealth," while the
district attorney is the "chief law enforcement officer in the county in which he is
elected." Id. § 732-206(a). Naturally, individuals in these capacities would need to
communicate with each other and occasionally coordinate their activities. This can
lead to the establishment of both personal and political relationships that could
lead to a conflict of interest.




under state law. Therefore, another mechanism would still be
needed to provide a means to investigate and prosecute criminal
activity that would have to be tried in state court. This is critical
because state crimes include a wide variety of offenses not covered
in federal statutes. 110
Therefore, some additional legislation was necessary in order
to close this apparent "loophole" in the Commonwealth Attorneys
Act. While these problems were always present, the Preate scandal
exposed just how serious they were. Thus, the members of the
General Assembly began working to pass the independent counsel
statute.11
Closing this loophole was one of the most important objectives
of the Pennsylvania statute's prime sponsors. Representative
Jeffrey E. Piccola pushed for passage of the legislation during his
tenure in the House of Representatives." 2 He continued his strong
support of the law after he won a special election and became a
member of the Senate of Pennsylvania in 1995.13 Senator Piccola
said that "the state law closes the loophole created by existing
legislation and provides for a truly independent investigative
procedure... 4 Piccola also pointed out that "this is a good law for
the attorney general, as well, who will know that a mechanism is in
place by which he will be able to avoid any possible conflicts of
interest. ' 5
Other supporters offered similar comments during the floor
debate prior to passage of the independent counsel law.
Representative Thomas R. Caltagirone argued that
[a] local district attorney would have neither the jurisdiction nor
the resources to investigate criminal conduct by members of the
Office of Attorney General occurring in more than one county,
and the close working relationship between the Office of
Attorney General and many local district attorneys makes such
investigations unlikely."'
110. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 101-9352 (1999) (the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code).
111. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 37.
114. Interview with Jeffrey E. Piccola, Senate of Pennsylvania, in Harrisburg,
Pa. (Dec. 28, 1999).
115. Id.
116. H. 178-56, 2nd Legis. Sess. 1626 (Pa. 1994) (remarks of Representative
Caltagirone). The House was debating House Bill 2741. See supra note 36.
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Therefore, Caltagirone continued, passage of the legislation would
"address[] this specific problem by providing the appointment of a
special investigative counsel and special independent prosecutors to
examine allegations of violations of State criminal law by the
Attorney General and his assistants.....7  Thus, the independent
counsel statute insures the people of Pennsylvania that an
investigative mechanism exists, if needed, to make sure that the
attorney general and his staff, who prosecute Pennsylvanians who
violate the law, will themselves live within the law.
B. The Covered Persons
Perhaps the most important reason why the Pennsylvania
statute is more likely to succeed than the federal statute is the
position of the individuals the Pennsylvania statute is designed to
cover. The state statute is narrowly tailored to cover investigations
and prosecutions of the attorney general, members of his staff, and
top officials from his campaign committee.' This list is limited to
those individuals who have a possible conflict of interest with the
attorney general.1 9
While the federal statute applied to a broad range of
individuals, it is best known for its use against the president."
After all, it was the Clinton impeachment that ultimately led to
Congress' decision not to renew the statute.121 There are, however,
considerable differences between a state attorney general and the
president; some of the systemic problems with the federal statute
simply are not present at the state level.
For example, the state attorney general, let alone members of
his staff who are covered by the statute, does not hold the same
kind of key political position within the lawmaking process as does
the president. The president, as the chief executive, is a vital
structural part of the legislative process itself.'22 Pennsylvania's
117. H. 178-56, 2nd Legis. Sess. 1626 (Pa. 1994) (remarks of Representative
Caltagirone).
118. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9312(c) (1999).
119. See id.
120. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 7-16, 91-97, and accompanying text.
122. The Constitution requires the president to sign all bills before they become
law, subject to Congress' authority to override any such vetoes with a two-thirds
majority vote in both houses. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. The president usually has
many legislative proposals and initiatives of his own. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3
(requiring the president to report to Congress on the state of the union and to
"recommend to [Congress'] Consideration such Measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient ... ").
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attorney general, while vested with a significant power with his
authority to investigate and prosecute violators of state law, lacks
the critical position within the day-to-day lawmaking process that
makes the president such a tempting target for an investigation."
For this reason, an investigation of the president immediately
is couched in a spirit of partisanship.' Political allies of the
president claim that even a proposed investigation is politically
motivated and is destined only to harass the administration so as to
prevent the president from achieving his legislative goals. An
investigation of a state attorney general, however, is not as likely to
effectively dominate the state political landscape. The lawmaking
process, which involves the General Assembly and the governor,
should be able to continue with minimal distraction.
12 5
In addition to his important role in the legislative process, the
president also possesses a wide array of other constitutional
powers,26 while the state attorney general's responsibilities are
limited to the authority granted him under Pennsylvania lawY.7 The
attorney general's power to prosecute is only a fraction (albeit a
sizable one) of the total whole of executive power. Conversely, the
president has broad powers in the areas of foreign affairs and the
national economy, and he has input into the many executive
agencies with responsibilities that range from environmental
protection to veterans' issues to agricultural concerns.' The
president has the power to appoint cabinet secretaries (including
the United States attorney general), American ambassadors, and
123. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 732-201 to -208 (West 1990) (creating the
Office of the Attorney General and outlining the powers its occupant holds). See
also PA. CONST. art. II-IV (detailing the powers and duties of the General
Assembly, the governor, and the methods for passing legislation). This is not to
say, however, that the attorney general is not a key figure within Pennsylvania
politics. The attorney general often has been viewed as a potential gubernatorial
candidate. In fact, Attorney General Ernie Preate was a candidate for governor in
1994 and was defeated in the Republican primary by then-Congressman Tom
Ridge. See Joseph J. Serwach, It's Singel vs. Ridge, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg),
May 11, 1994, at Al. The significant distinction to draw is that while the state
attorney general holds an inherently political office, the attorney general himself is
not a part of the daily processes of lawmaking and government decision-making in
the same way as the president of the United States. Perhaps the greatest test of
the Pennsylvania statute would be how it would work if the governor and the
attorney general had conflicting political agendas.
124. See Robert W. Gordon, supra note 91, at 701-21.
125. See PA. CONST. art. II-IV (detailing the powers and duties of the General
Assembly, the governor, and the methods for passing legislation).
126. See U.S. CONST. art. II (vesting the executive power in the president and
outlining his express powers).
127. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 732-201 to -208.
128. See U.S. CONST. art. II.
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federal judges.29 The office of the state attorney general, although
clearly political in nature, lacks the president's formidable arsenal
of executive authority. The fact that Pennsylvania's attorney
general is now an elected position3' is further evidence that the
office is independent from the governor, who holds the balance of
executive power. 3' These factors should help to discourage any
frivolous, politically motivated charges against the state attorney
general and to minimize disruption when any investigation is in
progress.
C. Safeguards
Another reason why Pennsylvania's statute is likely to succeed
is the number of safeguards built into the statute in order to prevent
its abuse. 32 The statute has provisions that require independent
counsels to follow strict ethical standards and to comply with tight
reporting deadlines. In addition, there are limitations on the
independent counsel's ability to expand the jurisdiction of his
prosecutorial inquiry.
Independent counsels appointed under the Pennsylvania
statute are required to comply with a number of particular ethical
standards.133 First, an investigative counsel who has conducted a
preliminary investigation may not serve as the independent
counsel."3 In addition, neither the independent counsel nor any
member of the counsel's law firm is permitted to represent any
person being investigated under the statute.13  These limitations
continue for a period of time after the independent counsel leaves
office. 136 The general counsel may remove the independent counsel
for "good cause.', 137 The statute defines good cause as a failure to
129. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving the president the authority to "appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States ...."). Such appointments are subject
to the "Advice and Consent of the Senate." See id.
130. See supra note 102.
131. See PA. CONST. art. IV (vesting the executive power in the governor).
132. Congress also included many of these same kinds of safeguards in the
federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994). However, the Starr investigation,
the impeachment of President Clinton, and Congress' subsequent decision not to
renew the federal independent counsel statute are ample evidence that they did
not work as intended. See supra notes 7-16, 91-97, and accompanying text.
133. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9339 (1999).
134. See id. § 9319(a).
135. See id. § 9339.
136. See id.
137. See id. § 9343.
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comply with the ethical rules that govern the independent counsel,
the attorney general, or county district attorneys.' 38
The statute also requires the independent counsel to make
periodic reports to the three-judge panel and to the General
Assembly. 9 The reports to the panel must be made every six
months and are to include a summary of expenses, and, at the end
of the counsel's tenure, a summary of all prosecutions." In
addition, the statute requires that the independent counsel report to
the General Assembly concerning the status of any investigations
or prosecutions, as well as how much money the investigation has
cost.'41
The statute also places tight financial and time constraints on
the Office of the Independent Counsel.'42 If the counsel's reported
expenditures reach $2 million, the three-judge panel may determine
on its own whether termination of the office would be
appropriate. The statute allows the panel to terminate the office
on its own motion two years after the counsel's appointment, and at
the end of each succeeding year." In addition, the statute requires
the independent counsel to prepare a statement of expenditures for
each fiscal year and to send that statement to the auditor general
for an audit.' The auditor general must report the results of each
audit to the General Assembly."
The statute also places significant restrictions on the
independent counsel's ability to expand his prosecutorial
jurisdiction.47 For example, if the independent counsel learns of
information about possible criminal violations by persons who are
not covered under his prosecutorial jurisdiction, the independent
counsel may submit that information to the general counsel.' 8 At
that time, the entire review process begins again.49 Only after going
138. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9343(a)(1) (1999). The statute says that "[a]n
independent counsel appointed under this chapter may be removed from office
only by the personal action of the General Counsel and only for good cause,
physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially
impairs the performance of the independent counsel's duties." Id.
139. See id. §§ 9337, 9342-9343.
140. See id. § 9342.
141. See id. § 9343(b).
142. See id.
143. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9343(b) (1999).
144. See id.
145. See id. § 9344.
146. See id.
147. See id. § 9319(b).
148. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9319 (1999).
149. See id.
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through all of the statutorily required steps, including approval by
the three-judge panel, can the independent counsel's prosecutorial
jurisdiction be expanded.5 The statute limits any independent
counsel, at all times, however, to investigating only those persons
covered under the statute.' An investigation of any individuals not
covered by the statute would have to be referred to the appropriate
law enforcement agency.152
As a final safeguard built into the statute, the Pennsylvania
law, like its federal predecessor, contains a sunset provision."3 The
law will expire five years after it went into effect, which will be in
March of 2003.' At that time, the General Assembly will have the
opportunity to review the law and make a decision as to whether or
not to renew it.
All of these safeguards, which include considerable legislative
oversight, help to insure that this much-needed statute will not be
abused. The ethical requirements, time and money constraints, and
limitations on the number of covered persons all help to make sure
that the statute will function as intended. The presence of these
safeguards hopefully will prevent the kinds of excesses that grew
out of the federal statute.
V. Conclusion
Pennsylvania's decision to enact an independent counsel law to
provide a means to investigate the attorney general and members of
his staff, if and when necessary, was a good one. The law closes a
major loophole in existing statutes. It also provides a mechanism
under which a fair and impartial investigation of criminal
wrongdoing can be conducted with public confidence. This statute
is well designed to serve that end.
150. See id.
151. See id. § 9312(c).
152. See id. § 9319(b). In fact, the statute presents several limitations here,
saying that
[i]f the independent counsel discovers or receives information about
possible violations of criminal law by persons other than those provided
for in section 9312 [the "covered persons"] and which are not covered by
the prosecutorial jurisdiction of the independent counsel and a request
for expansion under this subsection has not been made by the General
Counsel or the request for expansion under this subsection has been
denied by the panel, the independent counsel shall submit the
information to the appropriate law enforcement authority.
Id.
153. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9352 (1999).
154. See id.
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Those administering this law, however, must remain mindful of
the excesses which led to the demise of its federal model. The
impeachment of President Clinton revealed many of the federal
independent counsel law's shortcomings. The circumstances
surrounding the Pennsylvania law make it much more likely to
succeed.
By limiting the scope of independent counsels' inquiries,
tightly focusing the statute only on those individuals who absolutely
must be covered, and providing protections to prevent politically
motivated investigations, the Pennsylvania law is well on its way to
functioning as the General Assembly intended. If it does, it will
help to preserve the integrity of our republican form of
government, and it will serve the people of Pennsylvania well.
John M. Coles
